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    <title>Theory on ✻ Trym Nohr Fjørtoft</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Theory on ✻ Trym Nohr Fjørtoft</description>
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    <copyright>Copyright © 2026, Trym Nohr Fjørtoft.</copyright>
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      <title>Technical Legitimacy</title>
      <link>https://www.trymnf.com/publications/technical-legitimacy/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;p&gt;In studies of non-majoritarian institutions, there is a widespread idea that political neutrality, epistemic authority, and technical expertise are sources of legitimacy. Empirical studies tend to find that such appeals are effective sources of legitimacy, but theorists are overwhelmingly skeptical of their normative appeal. This paper’s conceptual ambition is to unify the disparate debates under the term technical legitimacy. The paper’s theoretical ambition is to improve on the normative debate on technical legitimacy. Existing defenses fail to robustly satisfy the reasons that ground delegation to non-majoritarian institutions. I propose conditions for accepting technical legitimacy that are reasonably robust against counterfactuals. Technical legitimacy must meet three criteria. Institutions must promote a functionally specified common good; build on sound and undistorted expertise; and, perhaps counterintuitively, contain appropriate venues for value input.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Inductive Risk and the Legitimacy of Non-Majoritarian Institutions</title>
      <link>https://www.trymnf.com/publications/inductive-risk-bjps/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Mar 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <description>&lt;h1 id=&#34;abstract&#34;&gt;Abstract&lt;/h1&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;In political discourse, it is common to claim that non-majoritarian institutions are legitimate because they are technical and value-free. Even though most analysts disagree, many arguments for non-majoritarian legitimacy rest on claims that work best if institutions are, in fact, value-free. This paper develops a novel standard for non-majoritarian legitimacy. It builds on the rich debate over the value-free ideal in philosophy of science, which has not, so far, been applied systematically to political theory literature on non- majoritarian institutions. This paper suggests that the argument from inductive risk, a strong argument against the value-free ideal, (1) shows why a naive claim to value freedom is a poor general foundation for non-majoritarian legitimacy; (2) provides a device to assess the degree of democratic value inputs required for an institution to be legitimate; which (3) shows the conditions under which a claim to technical legitimacy might still be normatively acceptable.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Symmetry in the delegation of power as a legitimacy criterion</title>
      <link>https://www.trymnf.com/publications/fjortoft-sandven-jcms/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 27 Jun 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.trymnf.com/publications/fjortoft-sandven-jcms/</guid>
      <description>&lt;h1 id=&#34;abstract&#34;&gt;Abstract&lt;/h1&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The EU’s power is expanding, calling for reassessments of its normative legitimacy. This article proposes a novel criterion for assessing the EU’s legitimacy: symmetry in the delegation of power. We illustrate the usefulness of this criterion  through an analysis of the European border regime. Existing analyses of the border regime have tended to dismiss it as weak and intergovernmental. We show, to the contrary, that it is both strong and weak. The EU wields significant power in border control but lacks power altogether in immigration policy. This asymmetry has rendered the EU incapable of discharging the moral responsibilities that arise in migration control, posing a novel legitimacy challenge. Finally, we argue that the symmetry criterion generalises and can shed light on the EU’s legitimacy beyond the area of migration.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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